Best Books on Military Strategy and Tactics

Unabridged value reproduction of the most critical and thought-provoking first four books of “On War” by Carl von Clausewitz, translated by J.J. Graham, and including footnotes. These books give the theory and goals of war that can be applied to conquering meeting rooms and empires.

This volume of On War includes topics of the Nature, Theory, and Strategy of War and Combat.

These of Clausewitz’s four books in one volume allow the reader to review and contemplate Clausewitz’s teachings as it applies to their life.

No student of influence should be without this historic philosophy book on leadership. This Value Classic Reprint provides a slim volume with full text at an affordable price.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR     3
BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ            3
BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR            6
BOOK II. ON THE THEORY OF WAR            38
BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL        70
BOOK IV. THE COMBAT 98

Strategies of war—and the subtle social game of everyday life—by the bestselling author of The 48 Laws of Power 

Robert Greene’s groundbreaking guides, The 48 Laws of Power, The Art of Seduction, and Mastery espouse profound, timeless lessons from the events of history to help readers vanquish an enemy, ensnare an unsuspecting victim, or become the greatest in your field. In The 33 Strategies of War, Greene has crafted an important addition to this ruthless and unique series.

Spanning world civilizations, synthesizing dozens of political, philosophical, and religious texts and thousands of years of violent conflict, The 33 Strategies of War is a comprehensive guide to the subtle social game of everyday life informed by the most ingenious and effective military principles in war. Structured in Greene’s trademark style, The 33 Strategies of War is the I-Ching of conflict, the contemporary companion to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.

Abundantly illustrated with examples from history, including the folly and genius of everyone from Napoleon to Margaret Thatcher, Shaka the Zulu to Lord Nelson, Hannibal to Ulysses S. Grant, as well as movie moguls, Samurai swordsmen, and diplomats, each of the thirty-three chapters outlines a strategy that will help you win life’s wars. Learn the offensive strategies that require you to maintain the initiative and negotiate from a position of strength, or the defensive strategies designed to help you respond to dangerous situations and avoid unwinnable wars. The great warriors of battlefields and drawing rooms alike demonstrate prudence, agility, balance, and calm, and a keen understanding that the rational, resourceful, and intuitive always defeat the panicked, the uncreative, and the stupid. An indispensable book, The 33 Strategies of War provides all the psychological ammunition you need to overcome patterns of failure and forever gain the upper hand.

Florentine statesman, writer, and political theorist, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) considered The Art of War his most important work. Five centuries later, after serving as a guide to Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and countless other military leaders, it remains an authoritative treatise on the fundamentals of warfare.
Best known as the political theorist who wrote The Prince, Machiavelli used this book to advocate strategies for Italy’s increased military prowess and political strength. Machiavelli was the first to propose a global context for the functional unity of war and politics, with the former serving as an instrument of the latter. Written in the form of dialogues, this 1520 work represents a humanistic treatment rather than a textbook approach. It clearly states and discusses the fundamentals of military organization and strategy: handling recruitment and weapons, motivating troops, demoralizing enemies, and achieving tactical and strategic advantages. Essential to the education of students of military history, strategy, and theory, The Art of War continues to inspire readers.

In this major and wholly original contribution to military history, John Keegan reverses the usual convention of writing about war in terms of generals and nations in conflict, which tends to leave the common soldier as a cipher. Instead, he focuses on what a set battle is like for the man in the thick of it—his fears, his wounds and their treatment, the mechanics of being taken prisoner, the nature of leadership at the most junior level, the role of compulsion in getting men to stand their ground, the intrusions of cruelty and compassion, the din and blood.

Set battles, with their unities of time and place, maybe a thing of the past, but this anatomy of what they were like for the men who fought them is an unforgettable mirror held up to human nature.

The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characteristics, and its political and social functions, over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are reprinted from the earlier book; four others have been extensively revised. The rest–twenty-two essays–are new.

The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations–the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of the revolutionary war in the modern world. Still, others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts–the First and Second World Wars–or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

John Boyd may be the most remarkable unsung hero in all of American military history. Some remember him as the greatest US fighter pilot ever – the man who, in simulated air-to-air combat, defeated every challenger in less than 40 seconds. Some recall him as the father of our country’s most legendary fighter aircraft – the F-15 and F-16. Still, others think of Boyd as the most influential military theorist since Sun Tzu. They know only half the story.

Boyd, more than any other person, saved fighter aviation from the predations of the Strategic Air Command. His manual of fighter tactics changed the way every air force in the world flies and fights. He discovered a physical theory that forever altered the way fighter planes were designed. Later in life, he developed a theory of military strategy that has been adopted throughout the world and even applied to business models for maximizing efficiency. On a personal level, Boyd rarely met a general he couldn’t offend. He was loud, abrasive, and profane. A man of daring, ferocious passion, and intractable stubbornness, he was that most American of heroes – a rebel who cared not for his reputation or fortune, but for his country.

In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world’s leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives.

The range of Freedman’s narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today. The core issue at the heart of strategy, the author notes, is whether it is possible to manipulate and shape our environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond one’s control. Time and again, Freedman demonstrates that the inherent unpredictability of this environment-subject to chance events, the efforts of opponents, the missteps of friends-provides strategy with its challenge and its drama. Armies or corporations or nations rarely move from one predictable state of affairs to another, but instead, feel their way through a series of stages, each one not quite what was anticipated, requiring a reappraisal of the original strategy, including its ultimate objective. Thus the picture of strategy that emerges in this book is one that is fluid and flexible, governed by the starting point, not the endpoint.

A brilliant overview of the most prominent strategic theories in history, from David’s use of deception against Goliath, to the modern use of game theory in economics, this masterful volume sums up a lifetime of reflection on strategy.

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Guerrilla Warfare by the revolutionary Che Guevara has become the guidebook for thousands of guerrilla fighters in various countries around the world. Guevara intended it to be a manual on guerrilla warfare, as inspiration for revolutionary movements in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, stressing the need for an underpinning political motivation to guerrilla methods, organization, and supply. Guevara emphasizes that guerrilla warfare is a favorable method against totalitarian regimes, where political opposition and legal civil struggle are impossible to conduct.

Written four hundred years before the birth of Christ, this detailed contemporary account of the struggle between Athens and Sparta stands an excellent chance of fulfilling the author’s ambitious claim that the work “was done to last forever.” The conflicts between the two empires over shipping, trade, and colonial expansion came to a head in 431 b.c. in Northern Greece, and the entire Greek world was plunged into 27 years of war. Thucydides applied a passion for accuracy and a contempt for myth and romance in compiling this exhaustively factual record of the disastrous conflict that eventually ended the Athenian empire.

For more than seventy years, Penguin has been the leading publisher of classic literature in the English-speaking world. With more than 1,700 titles, Penguin Classics represents a global bookshelf of the best works throughout history and across genres and disciplines. Readers trust the series to provide authoritative texts enhanced by introductions and notes by distinguished scholars and contemporary authors, as well as up-to-date translations by award-winning translators.

At a time when an unprecedented change in international affairs is forcing governments, citizens, and armed forces everywhere to re-assess the question of whether military solutions to political problems are possible any longer, Martin van Creveld has written an audacious searching examination of the nature of war and of its radical transformation in our own time.

For 200 years, military theory and strategy have been guided by the Clausewitzian assumption that war is rational—a reflection of national interest and an extension of politics by other means. However, van Creveld argues, the overwhelming pattern of conflict in the post-1945 world no longer yields fully to rational analysis. In fact, strategic planning based on such calculations is and will continue to be, unrelated to current realities.

Small-scale military eruptions around the globe have demonstrated new forms of warfare with a different cast of characters – guerilla armies, terrorists, and bandits—pursuing diverse goals by violent means with the most primitive to the most sophisticated weapons. Although these warriors and their tactics testify to the end of the conventional war as we’ve known it, the public and the military in the developed world continue to contemplate organized violence as a conflict between the superpowers.

At this moment, armed conflicts of the type van Creveld describes are occurring throughout the world. From Lebanon to Cambodia, from Sri Lanka and the Philippines to El Salvador, the Persian Gulf, and the strife-torn nations of Eastern Europe, violent confrontations confirm a new model of warfare in which tribal, ethnic, and religious factions do battle without high-tech weapons or state-supported armies and resources. This low-intensity conflict challenges existing distinctions between civilian and soldier, individual crime and organized violence, terrorism, and war. In the present global atmosphere, practices that for three centuries have been considered uncivilized, such as capturing civilians or even entire communities for ransom, have begun to reappear.

Pursuing bold and provocative paths of inquiry, van Creveld posits the inadequacies of our most basic ideas as to who fights wars and why and broaches the inevitability of man’s need to “play” at war. In turn brilliant and infuriating, this challenge to our thinking and planning current and future military encounters is one of the most important books on war we are likely to read in our lifetime.

On Guerrilla Warfare is Mao Zedong’s case for the extensive use of an irregular form of warfare in which small groups of combatants use mobile military tactics in the forms of ambushes and raids to combat a larger and less mobile formal army. Mao wrote the book in 1937 to convince Chinese political and military leaders that guerilla style-tactics were necessary for the Chinese to use in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the “nuts and bolts” of war. He considers the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, often mentioned (but rarely explored) by the vast majority of books on military history. By concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, van Creveld is also able to offer an original reinterpretation of military history.

“The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time.”—Library Journal

Strategy is a seminal work of military history and theory, and a perfect companion to Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clausewitz’s On War.

This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world’s foremost military thinkers. In his writing, he stressed movement, flexibility, and surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns, it was vital to take an indirect approach. Rather than attacking the enemy head-on, one must dislocate their psychological and physical balance. With key examples from World War I and World War II (think trench warfare vs Blitzkreig), Liddell Hart defines the practical principles of waging war—“Adjust your end to your means,” “Take a line of operation which offers alternate objectives”—and proves they are as fundamental in the worlds of politics and business as they are in warfare.

From a highly decorated general, a brilliant new way of understanding war and its role in the twenty-first century.

Drawing on his vast experience as a commander during the first Gulf War, and in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, General Rupert Smith gives us a probing analysis of modern war. He demonstrates why today’s conflicts must be understood as intertwined political and military events, and makes clear why the current model of total war has failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other recent campaigns. Smith offers a compelling contemporary vision for how to secure our world and the consequences of ignoring the new, shifting face of war.